Ddating txt 1251
Solomon qualified for acting service under subsection (a)(3) of the FVRA, because he was a senior employee at the NLRB.In January 2011, the President nominated Solomon to serve as the NLRB’s general counsel on a permanent basis.The fact that certain Senators stated that they wanted to give the President more flexibility to appoint acting officials does not mean that they got exactly what they wanted. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. Perceiving a threat to the Senate’s advice and consent power, see Rosen-berg 6, Congress acted again.Nor does a statement by one of the sponsors of the FVRA—who said that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants—overcome the clear text, particularly given that the very next Senator to speak offered a contradictory account of the provision. Subsection (b)(1) prohibited Solomon from continuing his service as acting general counsel once the President nominated him to fill the position permanently. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. In 1998, it replaced the Vacancies Act with the FVRA. SW General filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.SW General sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the complaint was invalid because, under subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA, Solomon could not perform the duties of general counsel to the NLRB after having been nominated to fill that position. (1) Subsection (b)(1) applies to any “person” and prohibits service “as an acting officer for an office under this section.” “Person” has an expansive meaning that can encompass anyone who performs acting duties under the FVRA. The rest of the FVRA also uses the pairing of “person” and “section” to encompass anyone serving as an acting officer under the FVRA, and Congress could readily have used more specific language if it intended subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants acting under (a)(1).The NLRB countered that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under subsection (a)(1), not to acting officers who, like Solomon, serve under (a)(2) or (a)(3). It concluded that the prohibition on acting service by nominees contained in subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting officers, regardless of whether they serve pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). The dependent clause at the beginning of subsection (b)(1)—“[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)”—confirms the breadth of the prohibition on acting service by nominees.Moreover, subsection (b)(2) specifies that (b)(1) “shall not apply” to certain people who are “serving as the first assistant.” If (b)(1) applied only to first assistants, stating that limitation would be superfluous. The Board argues that, when Congress revised this original draft, it made changes to give the President more flexibility to appoint acting officers and did not intend to broaden the prohibition on nominees performing acting service. shall” perform that function, with an exception allowing the President to instead fill the post with a person already serving in a PAS office. That narrow window of acting service was later lengthened to 30 days. Congress then amended the Vacancies Act to clarify that it applies to such agencies, while at the same time lengthening the term of permissible acting service to 120 days, with a tolling period while a nomination is pending. By 1998, approximately 20 percent of PAS offices in executive agencies were occupied by “temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period . These acting officers filled high-level positions, sometimes in obvious contravention of the Senate’s wishes.
Text in the format string is copied directly to the result, except where format specifiers are used.In January 2013, an NLRB Regional Director, exercising authority on Solomon’s behalf, issued an unfair labor practices complaint against respondent SW General, Inc. And “under this section” clarifies that subsection (b)(1) applies to all of §3345: The FVRA contains cross-references to specific subsections and paragraphs.An Administrative Law Judge concluded that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and the NLRB agreed. But subsection (b)(1) refers to §3345, which contains all of the ways a person may become an acting officer.As a result, Solomon became ineligible to perform the duties of general counsel in an acting capacity once the President nominated him to fill that post. Subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity. In statutes, “notwithstanding” clauses show that one provision prevails over another in the event of a conflict. (2) The Board argues that, because the phrase “notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)” does not mention (a)(2) or (a)(3), Congress did not intend the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) to apply to people serving as acting officers under those provisions. This interpretive canon applies, however, only when “circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.” at 81.The prohibition applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA. Here, that means that subsection (b)(1) applies even when it conflicts with the default rule in (a)(1) that first assistants “shall perform” acting duties. The Board relies on the “interpretive canon, , 536 U. A “notwithstanding” clause does not naturally give rise to such an inference; it just shows which of two or more provisions prevails in the event of a conflict.
Format specifiers act as placeholders in the string, defining how subsequent function arguments should be formatted and inserted into the result.